In a paper in the March 2004 American Economic Review, Justine Hastings studies the acquisition of a sizable independent gasoline retailer, Thrifty Oil Company (Thrifty), by a vertically integrated refiner/retailer, ARCO. She employs a difference-in-differences approach on a panel of station-specific prices to examine the price effects at competing stations of this transaction. She finds that the loss of an independent marketer increased retail gasoline prices by five cents per gallon, but changes in horizontal concentration and differences in the degree of vertical control ARCO exerted over its newly acquired branded outlets did not affect prices. Further empirical results lend support to a particular model of consumer brand loyalty as the underlying mechanism for the post-acquisition price increase.
These results have several implications. Previous research had generally shown that greater degrees of vertical integration are associated with lower retail gasoline prices. 1 Hastings' results suggest that regulations aimed at restricting refiners' vertical control may in fact be benign. Also, merger enforcement may be an appropriate instrument to protect against price effects from the decline in independents' market share from their acquisition by vertically-integrated refiners. In addition, the merger policy implications may transcend gasoline retailing since brand loyalty drives consumption decisions in a variety of product markets.
The sheer size of the estimated price effect -five cents per gallon amounts to a 50 percent increase in retail margins -along with a desire to better understand the novel mechanism behind it, motivated us to revisit Hastings' analysis. 2 Being unable to acquire her data, we used an alternative source, which in aggregate is very similar to the original data set. While there are differences between the two data sets, the five-cent effect is large enough that we would expect to find an effect of a similar order of magnitude. Ultimately, however, we find an effect of approximately three-tenths of a cent per gallon, which is of little economic (and often statistical) significance. This finding is robust to using various sub-1 For examples of papers that find vertical integration pro-competitive or bans on vertical integration being anticompetitive see Barron and Umbeck (1984) , Shepard (1990 Shepard ( , 1993 and Vita (2000) . 2 The average price of regular grade gasoline, without tax, to end users in California in 1997 was 86 cents per gallon. The average wholesale price of regular gasoline in California was 76 cents per gallon in 1997. Department of Energy, Energy Information Service, gasoline prices by formulation, grade and sales type. Available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_allmg_c_SCA_EPMR_cpgal_a.htm.
samples, analysis of higher-frequency data, unavailable in Hastings' data, and whether or not we use clustered standard errors at the station-level.
In addition, we examine the theory of brand loyalty as outlined by Hastings. She employs a modified Hotelling model in which both firms will raise prices after an independent converts to a branded station. We point out that the corresponding increase in gross consumer utility in the model implies that total welfare must also increase as a consequence of rebranding. Furthermore, we find parameter values such that total consumer surplus increases after rebranding, even in the face of an across-the-board price increase.
Thus, our empirical results cast doubt on whether ARCO's acquisition of Thrifty led to higher prices. In addition, our theoretical analysis suggests that, even if the acquisition led to a price increase, the welfare effects are ambiguous in Hastings' model of brand loyalty.
I. The ARCO/Thrifty Transaction
Hastings (2004) examines the price effect of ARCO's 1997 long term lease of 265 retail sites from Thrifty. The Thrifty stations were located primarily in San Diego and Los Angeles. This transaction marked the exit of the largest independent/unbranded chain of gasoline stations in Southern California at the time. We refer the reader to Hastings (2004) for a discussion of the details of the transaction.
However, we add two pieces of context: this transaction was part of a trend in California and the firms had a prior vertical relationship.
In 1982, even though it was a vertically-integrated refiner with a branded retail presence, ARCO adopted a low-price strategy, making its retail prices similar to those of Thrifty and other unbranded outlets. In 1996 the introduction of CARB Phase II gasoline led to the exit of several small refineriesmost of which supplied the unbranded wholesale market -and an output reduction from the California refineries that remained. 3 The tighter supply of gasoline in California resulted in periodic pricing inversions, whereby unbranded prices rise above branded prices at either wholesale or retail. 4 Consequently, during periods of 1996 ARCO was setting retail prices below those of some independent rivals. To avoid such undercutting, World Oil, a sizable independent retailer in Southern California, signed a branding agreement with Exxon around the time of the ARCO/Thrifty transaction.
Prior to the announcement of the ARCO/Thrifty transaction in March 1997, Thrifty was one of ARCO's largest dealers. Specifically, 44 of the stations that ARCO acquired were already selling ARCObranded gasoline. 5 In January 1997 a press report stated that ARCO had signed an agreement to supply unbranded gasoline to 110 of Thrifty's stations. Thus, over half of Thrifty's 265 stations were already being supplied by ARCO before the transaction was consummated. 6 In total, over 15 percent of the stations ARCO leased were already branded ARCO and half of the stations were being supplied by ARCO. Therefore, the change in branding and vertical market structure induced by the transaction affected a smaller number of stations than might appear.
II. Analysis

A. Data Sets
Hastings uses data from the Whitney Leigh Corporation (W-L), including a census of station locations in Southern California and pricing data on a 20 percent sample of stations in this census report. We also obtained a 1997 census of gasoline station locations from the California Energy Commission (CEC).
It is important to gauge the extent to which the OPIS data differ from the W-L data. To summarize, both the W-L and OPIS data sets provide retail price information at the stationspecific level. While the W-L data set is a more representative sample of the true distribution of brands, the OPIS data are available at a greater frequency (i.e., daily or weekly), for a larger number of stations and for a longer time period; possibly allowing for a more precise estimate of the extent to which the ARCO/Thrifty transaction affected retail gasoline prices.
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The ultimate question is to what extent the distribution of brands in the OPIS data could bias our results. We can make a conjecture based on Hastings' Table 3 , which documents how the ARCO/Thrifty transaction differentially affected "high-share", "mid-share", and "low-share" brands. 13 (The effect on ARCO's pre-merger stations is estimated separately.) Column (7) of our Table 1 displays Hastings' classification for each brand. Hastings posits that market share is positively correlated with the degree of brand loyalty. Consequently, independents (e.g., Thrifty) compete most closely with low-share brands (e.g., Citgo), so that the ARCO/Thrifty transaction should increase prices the most at low-share branded stations. Indeed, using the W-L data Hastings finds that prices increased at low-share, mid-share, and high-share brands by approximately $0.07, $0.05, and $0.03 per gallon, respectively. Consistent with its low-price strategy, the estimated effect on ARCO is similar to the low-share group.
Based on the OPIS data over-sampling high-and mid-share brands at the expense of low-share brands and ARCO, we expect our estimate of the transition's effect on all stations to be lower than that estimated by Hastings. However, this difference should be small, since the effect on high-and mid-share brands was $0.03 and $0.05. Additionally, the OPIS data over-samples a low-share brand, Citgo, in San Diego, especially relative to the W-L data. So the effect of the distribution of brands in the San Diego OPIS data is ambiguous. For the OPIS pooled sample (consisting of both Los Angeles and San Diego),
we expect that the difference between the OPIS and W-L data sets may still lead to a slightly smaller estimated effect. We would expect our estimate to be at least $0.03 per gallon, possibly higher.
B. Graphical Analysis
12 The higher frequency of the OPIS data also allows for checks on the accuracy of the data. For approximately ten percent of the stations there were days when premium or mid-grade prices were reported as regular grade. Due to the higher frequency of the data we were able to identify these misclassified observations and perform additional sensitivity analyses. 13 There was one exception to the relationship between market share and assigning firms to a brand category as described in footnote 25 of Hastings (2004) . Mobil had a large market share in California but was assigned to the middle category based on similarity of the price response of Mobil stations and Texaco stations to the ARCOThrifty transaction. Despite the use of differing price series, it is striking how closely the graphs presented in Figure 1 match the general shape and levels of the corresponding graphs, Figure 1 , presented in Hastings' study.
In each city the average gasoline price level for each set of stations peaks in October 1997, with the rise and fall more pronounced in Los Angeles than in San Diego. Hastings' graphs exhibit the same features.
However, the June price levels in our OPIS data exceed those in the W-L data by a few cents per gallon, within each city and for both sets of firms.
When considering the trends in the time series of those stations that competed against a Thrifty versus those that did not in the OPIS data, there is substantially less agreement with the W-L data. For
Los Angeles the two series track each other very closely, with the prices charged by Thrifty-competing stations always (i.e., both before and after the ARCO/Thrifty transaction was consummated) lying beneath those charged by those stations not located close to a Thrifty. This trend differs markedly from that in the W-L data for Los Angeles, which show that relative to the control group, Thrifty competitors have lower prices before and higher average prices after the transaction. The graph for the pooled sample for the OPIS data presented in Figure 1 again shows no effect on the relative positioning of the control or treatment group price series over the period. This result is not surprising given that most of the observations in the pooled sample come from Los Angeles.
C. Econometric Analysis
In this section we consider several empirical specifications based upon the econometric research design employed by Hastings. Specifically, we adopt Hastings' fixed-effects or difference-in-differences approach to identifying the impact of Thrifty conversions on market prices, both in the aggregate and by individual brand, and for both the pooled and individual OPIS city samples. Table 2 presents the results of estimating the following regression:
(1)
where denotes the average price charged by the i-th station during the last week of the t-th time period. The dummy variable takes a value of one if station i is located within a mile of a Thrifty station during period t (i.e., "competed" with an independent Thrifty outlet prior to its conversion, February and June). Thus, a negative estimate of the coefficient implies that the transaction (the loss of an independent competitor) is correlated with an increase in the average price at these competing stations. The city-time fixed effects are captured by the interaction of city dummies and time dummies, . For the individual city regressions the city-time effects are simply time effects. The variables , , and represent the constant term, the station-specific fixed effect and the error term, respectively. The results shown in Table 2 are estimated using the four monthly time periods {February, June, October, December} in 1997 used by Hastings. estimator. The models appear to fit the data relatively well, with the R-squared ranging from 0.90 to 0.92.
The coefficient estimates for the individual city-month interactions are economically relevant, ranging from $0.02 to $0.13 per gallon. These estimates closely resemble Hastings' findings using the W-L data, which is not surprising given the similarity of the time trends in the graphical analyses.
By contrast, the coefficient estimates pertaining to the conversion variable in our Table 2 differ substantially from Hastings'. Hastings' regression results for the pooled W-L sample indicate that the loss of Thrifty as a competitor is associated with a price increase of $0.05 per gallon. For the OPIS pooled sample, the coefficient estimate on the conversion variable is likewise negative -however, it is an order of magnitude smaller at just two-tenths of a cent per gallon and not significantly different from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. For the Los Angeles OPIS sub-sample, the point estimate 14 A third, technical, difference is that Hastings considers whether each station competes with any independent, not just Thrifty. However, she notes in her footnote 18 (p. 324) that the only source of variation in this variable comes from the Thrifty conversion. Thus, the station-specific fixed effect should capture any effect of competition from non-Thrifty independents, with no effect on our results.
of the conversion indicator is actually positive -indicating a price decrease after the acquisition -but quite small, less than one-tenth of a cent per gallon. For the San Diego OPIS sub-sample, the point estimate is found to be negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The magnitude of the estimated conversion effect is $0.01 per gallon. This estimate comports with our graphical analysis Figure 1 (c) but is smaller than the effect in Hastings' San Diego graph, $0.04 to $0.06 per gallon. This estimate is also less than our expected effect given that the San Diego OPIS data over-sample a low-share brand, Citgo.
As mentioned earlier, the OPIS data possess the benefit of being available at a higher frequency and also allows for the effects of the ARCO/Thrifty transaction to be considered over a longer time period than Hastings' W-L data. Table 3 presents the results of estimating the equation (1) where t spans all individual weeks. This "two-way" fixed-effects specification controls for both station-level (group) and week (period) fixed-effects within each sample. The week fixed effects control for any week-specific unobserved factors that influence retail gasoline prices symmetrically across all stations in a city. This equation was estimated separately for Los Angeles, San Diego and the pooled samples. In Table 3 , the first column for each sample is estimated using the 52 weeks of data in 1997. The second column for each sample is estimated using three years of weekly data, 1996-1998.
One concern with the specification in equation (1) when we go from quarterly to weekly data is the average price at a given station for a given week is likely to be highly correlated to the average price at the station during the previous week (or weeks). Bertrand et al. (2004) show that difference-indifferences models relying on panel data that are highly autocorrelated can result in severely downwardbiased estimated standard errors, thereby leading to misleading findings of statistical precision. To control for the effects of autocorrelation, the bottom row of Table 3 presents t-statistics that reflect clustering of the estimated standard errors at the individual-station level.
In these specifications, the estimated coefficients on the conversion indicators have the expected sign (negative, indicating a price increase) but again are small, less than $0.01 per gallon. To the extent that the ARCO/Thrifty transaction had any upward impact on market-level retail gasoline prices, these results strongly suggest that it was much smaller than that suggested by Hastings' study using the W-L data. The bottom row of Table 3 shows that statistical significance diminishes considerably when we cluster standard errors to control for within-station autocorrelation. The conversion effect's statistical significance tends to diminish as well when estimating the model using all three years of data.
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As discussed above, Hastings concludes her analysis by disaggregating the effect of the transaction by high-, mid-, and low-share brands to see if the pricing patterns support her theory of product differentiation with brand loyalty. While these results are generally consistent with the theorythe magnitude of the effect increases as we move from high-to mid-and then low-share brands -the evidence suggesting significant across group differences is rather weak. The coefficient estimate on the mid-share variable is not statistically different from that on the low-share variable, while the coefficient estimate on the high-share variable is statistically different from that on the mid-share variable at the 10 percent level. It seems that these results would have been even weaker had Mobil been placed in the high brand group, which would have been more consistent with its market share as reported in footnote 25 of Hastings (2004) .
We also tested this theory with the OPIS data. Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation
(1) by individual brand (i.e., where the dependent variable is the average weekly price charged by each station) for each of the brands for which sufficient price observations are available. Like the previous regressions, these models compare the prices in a control group, the branded stations not near a rebranded Thrifty, to a treatment group. These regressions use data for all weeks in 1997 controlling for both station and week fixed effects. We present t-statistics using Huber/White robust standard errors as well as station-level clustering. In Table 4 , we order the brands according to Hastings' classification as high-(Shell), mid-(Mobil and Texaco), or low-share (Citgo) brands.
15 Additional results showing the robustness with respect to the treatment of stations with mis-classified premium and mid-grade gasoline prices are available, currently, Table A-1. The results did not change by more than onetenth of a cent per gallon when we either dropped those stations or when we used the minimum daily price instead of the average of the daily prices when aggregating the daily prices to weekly prices.
The rightmost column of theoretical hypothesis and empirical results using the W-L data suggest that this type of firm should experience the largest price increase upon the re-branding of an independent competitor.
III. Theoretical Model of Brand Preferences
Hastings posits that a demand structure consistent with her empirical results using the W-L data involves heterogeneous preferences over brands of gasoline. In this section we employ such a model to demonstrate that even when rebranding leads to price increases, its effect on welfare remains ambiguous.
Consider a Hotelling model of product differentiation, with two firms A and B at the endpoints of a line with length l. 16 Three consumer types are uniformly distributed along the line with unit demands.
Proportions α and β are brand-loyal to A and B respectively, while a proportion γ views gasoline as an homogenous product. With transport costs of t per unit, if both firms find it profitable to sell to brandloyal as well as non-brand-loyal customers then equilibrium prices will be
where by assumption each price lies below some reservation price r which represents the value to brandloyal consumers of purchasing their preferred brand in an adjacent market. Note in particular that each price is increasing in the proportion of brand-loyal consumers of both types.
Assume for the moment that firm A is branded (say, Chevron) while B is an independent. Thus, all the β-type consumers would purchase their preferred brand of gasoline (say, ARCO) in the adjacent market at the reservation price r. Suppose further that A finds it profit-maximizing to compete with B over the γ-type (non-brand loyal) consumers. Then firm A sells to both α-and γ-types, B sells only to γ-types and equilibrium prices are as above but with β = 0.
If firm B is acquired by and rebranded as ARCO, then in an interior equilibrium we have β > 0 and prices rise for firms A and B. Although rebranding harms α-and γ-type consumers through higher prices, β-type consumers are better off since they no longer must travel to the adjacent market to obtain their preferred brand of gasoline. Whereas they previously paid r, after rebranding they pay p B < r.
Indeed, with identical costs for all firms and unit demands, rebranding must lead to an increase in total welfare: total output and total production costs remain the same, while β-type consumers avoid the costs of traveling to the adjacent market for their preferred brand of gasoline. In addition, having identical (branded) firm types at each end of the Hotelling line leads to a more efficient matching of nonbrand-loyal consumers with firms in terms of minimizing transportation costs (at least when the α-and β-types exist in roughly similar proportion).
Furthermore, we found parameter values such that rebranding increases total consumer surplus, even while both prices rise. This occurs when the gains that β-type consumers reap from rebranding outweigh the harm to α-and γ-type consumers. In most such examples we found, the proportion of nonbrand loyal consumers (γ) is relatively large. 17 Intuitively, the firms compete fiercely over this segment, 17 Specifically, here are the parameter values for one example: α = 9/32, β = 1/32, γ = 11/16, c = 1, t = 1, l = 1, r = 15/4, v 1 = 5, v 0 = 3. The parameter v 1 represents the gross utility to α-type and β-type consumers from purchasing their preferred brand of gasoline, while v 0 represents the gross utility to γ-type (non-brand-loyal) consumers from purchasing any brand of gasoline.
both before and after rebranding. Consequently, the post-rebranding price increases are small. So long as the reservation price r is high -but not so high to induce firms to ignore the non-brand loyal segmentthe gain to β-type consumers outweighs the effect of the price increase on α-and γ-type consumers.
Thus, while Hastings' theoretical model does show that rebranding leads to across-the-board price increases, this result arises only because some consumers receive higher gross utility from purchasing branded product. Consequently, total welfare must increase as well, and in some situations consumer welfare will simultaneously rise.
IV. Conclusions
According to Hastings' analysis of the W-L data, the ARCO/Thrifty acquisition increased prices at nearby competing stations by $0.05 per gallon, on average. Our analysis of the OPIS data provides a very different estimated price effect of this transaction, suggesting that if there was any price effect, it was an order of magnitude smaller. In a number of instances we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect at standard levels of significance. While we used a different data set, we have found no reason that would explain this discrepancy. Regardless of which data set more accurately depicts the transaction's actual impact on prices, our theoretical analysis reveals some difficulties in inferring welfare effects from price changes when consumers attach value to particular brands of gasoline.
Merger retrospectives are inherently important. They not only inform antitrust policy but also increase our understanding of consumer behavior and competitive forces. Hastings' research design provides an excellent example of the methodology to use and the type of event that needs to be studied.
Unfortunately, demand for merger retrospectives continues to exceed supply.
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In addition, this paper reinforces the point, made by Hamermesh (2007) , that additional attempts to replicate and reproduce empirical results in published papers would be beneficial. More scientific replication will increase the credibility of empirical economic research and may increase its use by policymakers. Notes: Each row/brand corresponds to a separate regression. The estimates control for station-and week-specific fixed effects and a constant term. Robust t-statistics appear in parentheses, while t-statistics reflecting clustering at the station-level appear in brackets. The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The symbol "" indicates that the model could not be estimated. The dependent variable is the OPIS average weekly retail price (measured in dollars per gallon) for regular unleaded gasoline by station. Absolute values of robust t-statistics appear in parentheses. Estimated coefficients and t-statistics for station dummies, week dummies, and the common week time trend not reported. The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The regression results reported in columns labeled with (1) are the results from Table 3 . The results labeled with (2) use the minimum price each week rather than the mean price for the week. The regression results reported in columns labeled with (3) exclude stations where the price of premium or mid grade gasoline was reported for regular gasoline.
